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ABSTRACT 
 
In July 2004, 147 World Trade Organization (WTO) member countries met in Geneva where the 
developed countries agreed to cut back and eventually eliminate an estimated $350 billion of their 
farm and export subsidies.  The accord was hammered out by five WTO members including India 
and Brazil and submitted to the WTO’s plenary session where it was finally ratified on July 31, 
2004. The Fifth Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization held in Cancun in 
September 2003 collapsed from inside as internal squabbles and irreconcilable philosophical 
differences developed between the developed countries and the developing countries.  The WTO, 
which started with noble objectives of raising the global standards of living through international 
trade agreements and cooperation among the WTO member countries, appeared to be teetering 
on the verge of a complete collapse.  Over the past decade, through five ministerial conferences, 
the WTO member countries gradually got polarized into two main blocks, the “have’s” and the 
“have not’s”, the developed countries and the still developing countries respectively.  One of the 
important items of contention was the issue of reduction and elimination of the huge farm 
subsidies in the European Union (EU) and the United States (US).  At the 2003 WTO conference 
in Cancun, 21 of the developing countries formed a group, known as G-21 initiated under the 
leadership of Brazil and India, and insisted on discussions for elimination of the farm subsidies of 
the EU-US combine.  The EU and US governments give billions of dollars worth of agricultural 
and export subsidies annually to their farmers that allow them to have a competitive advantage in 
international markets in effect preventing agricultural producers in developing countries from 
having access to global markets.  The EU delegates insisted that the four Singapore issues must be 
dealt with first before including any discussions on the issues of farm subsidies on the agenda.  
The G-21 over night swelled into G-70.  The developing countries refused to be pushed into a 
corner and have proved that they are now a force to reckon with.  The WTO Cancun conference 
came to a dramatic end without any agreement, leaving the negotiations in a deadlock. At the 
historic July 2004 WTO negotiations in Geneva, an accord has been reached under which the 
developed countries agreed to reduce and eventually eliminate their export and farm subsidies. 
The developing countries also agreed to lower their tariffs on imports from EU-US and other 
developed countries.   The accord is expected to pave the way for the resumption of the WTO 
Doha Round of multilateral negotiations to liberalize world trade. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
he WTO is comprised of a multilateral trading system, developed through a series of trade 
negotiations, known as “rounds,” held under the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT).  
The last round of the GATT, known as the 1986-94 Uruguay Round, led to the creation of the WTO.  
The ministerial conference of the WTO member countries is the highest-level body for its decision making process, 
mandated to meet at least once in every two years.  Some of the main objectives of the WTO are to raise the 
standards of living of the member countries, to ensure full employment, to expand their production of, and trade in, 
T 
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goods and services and to improve trade in developing countries.  These objectives are to be achieved in a manner 
consistent with the respective needs and concerns of the member countries at different levels of development.  The 
overall objective of WTO is to liberalize global trade and to improve the welfare of people of the member countries.  
It provides a forum for governments to negotiate trade agreements and a place to settle trade disputes.  All efforts to 
achieve the WTO objectives are made only through negotiations and all decisions at WTO are taken only by 
consensus among all the member countries (www.wto.org, 2003). 
 
THE WTO MINISTERIAL CONFERENCES  
 
At the first WTO ministerial conference held in Singapore in 1996, four new issues were raised which later 
became very critical and contentious and stalled the global trade negotiations in Cancun in 2003.   These four issues 
were proposed by the developed countries for discussion, negotiation, and eventual implementation by WTO. These 
are Trade and Investment, Trade and Competition Policy, Trade Facilitation, and Transparency in Government 
Procurement. These issues were widely criticized by developing countries, as they would hurt the interests of poor 
and developing countries.    A coalition of anti-global trade non-governmental organizations in Indonesia argued 
that, for instance, wider access for foreign investors to bid on government procurement would only cut local 
companies’ chances to win the bid (Wulandari, 2003).  
 
 The Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference was held in Doha, Qatar in 2001.  There, the WTO members 
agreed to begin a new campaign for liberalized trade rules, aiming to commit to a new round of tariff cuts and 
removal of trade barriers that should, in theory, increase trade and prosperity for everyone (Stokes, 2003).  The 
Doha round came to be known as the “Development Round”.  The Doha Round declaration established a series of 
negotiating objectives and mandated that the Doha development agenda must be completed by January 1, 2005.  The 
agenda items included agricultural subsidies, services, industrial tariffs, implementation, environment and Trade 
Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs).  The agenda also included the four controversial Singapore issues.  
One of the important items of the agenda is reduction and elimination of the huge agricultural subsidies in European 
Union (EU) and United States (US).  
 
FARM AND EXPORT SUBSIDIES 
 
According to Hernandez Allende (2004), there exists a hidden agenda of protectionism in the trade policies 
of developed countries.  There is a contradiction between the rhetoric of free trade that is proposed by the rich 
countries and the zeal with which they are willing to protect certain of their own national industries from 
competition.  As Ricupero (2003), secretary-general of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 
observes, “instead of open markets, there are too many barriers that stunt, stifle, and starve.  Instead of fair 
competition, there are subsidies by rich countries that tilt the playing field against the poor.” According to Palley 
(2003), the dominant issue at Cancun WTO ministerial was that of EU and US agricultural policies that are 
significantly protectionist and impose tariffs and quotas on agricultural imports.  Furthermore, they give enormous 
production subsidies to their farmers.  The result is overproduction and the surpluses are dumped on the global 
markets driving down prices.  For example, Japan imposes tariffs on imports of rice equal to about 700% of 
production cost, thus shutting off rice imports from Thailand.  The $4 billion US subsidies to US cotton farmers 
helped to halve the world price of cotton between 1997 and 2002 bringing untold misery to some African countries 
that are heavily dependent on cotton exports for their export earnings.  The total agricultural subsidies and 
protections given by developed countries to their farmers is estimated at $300 billion.  These policies are detrimental 
to the tenets of free trade and prevent developing countries from having access to the developed countries’ markets 
(Palley, 2003). 
 
THE COLLAPSE AT CANCUN 
 
 The Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference was held in Cancun, Mexico in September 2003.  From the 
beginning, the trade talks at Cancun appeared to be doomed.  When the text of the agenda items was released, 
delegates from the developing countries were dismayed to see that many of their pre-submitted items were left out.  
Some of these items were part of a detailed agenda that had been negotiated in preparation for the conference among 
the developing countries (Chafe, 2004).  One of the important items left out was the issue of reduction and 
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elimination of the huge EU-US farm subsidies.  The EU commission rejected the total elimination of all agricultural 
subsidies.  Negotiators failed even to agree on the terms for liberalizing agricultural markets and no progress was 
made at the key September 2003 meeting in Cancun (Harris, 2004). 
 
 At the WTO 2003 Cancun meeting, 21 developing countries formed as a group, the G-21, under the 
initiative of India and Brazil, and insisted on negotiations for reduction of agricultural subsidies in the rich countries.  
The EU delegates continued to insist that the four Singapore issues must be dealt with first before any discussions on 
other development issues that are already on the top of the agenda items.  The G-21 over night swelled into G-70.  
The developing countries refused to be pushed into a corner and proved that they are now a force to reckon with.  
The WTO Cancun conference ended in a collapse without any agreement, leaving the negotiations in a deadlock.  
As Stokes (2003) states, the WTO Cancun collapse marked a watershed for global dialogue on trade. Developing 
nations demonstrated unprecedented solidarity and power.   As a result, the WTO may never be the same rich men’s 
club again.  The confrontation revealed a culture clash – a profound chasm in philosophy and self-interest between 
the rich and poor nations, the have’s and the have not’s, – over how best to capture the benefits and redress 
inequities in the trade globalization process.  A G-21 proposal to reduce the EU-US farm subsidies and market 
barriers largely drove the agenda at Cancun.  India in particular argued that its 600 million poor farmers could not 
survive if exposed to subsidies-backed competition from America’s corporate farmers (Stokes, 2003).  The 
developing countries led by India and Brazil stood solidly together to demand that there would be no acceptance of 
subsidies of the rich for their agriculture in exchange for concessions on the Singapore issues. India’s minister 
Jaitley stated that India’s investment policies could not be determined by WTO in Geneva (Punj, 2003). 
 
CONSEQUENCES OF CANCUN 
 
 The WTO Cancun conference clearly demonstrated to the world that the chasm between the developed and 
developing countries on issues such as trade liberalization in agriculture and the four Singapore issues is too wide to 
be bridged. It is also obvious that the deadline, January 1, 2005 to complete the Doha Round negotiations cannot be 
met with. Cancun conference also underscored the fact that the principal areas of concern for WTO are agricultural 
subsidies and the four Singapore issues and that only a trade off between these two areas can lead to a compromise 
among the principal protagonists, the EU-US versus the 70 disparate developing countries.  According to 
Ramachandran (2003), the EU also conceded that formation of the G-21 coalition at Cancun forced the WTO to 
rework its strategy for multinational trade negotiations.  Prodi, the president of European Commission, remarked, 
“there is a common voice which has to be heard.  When 21 countries with differing interests could join hands, they 
have to be listened to, especially as they account for half the world’s population,” (Ramachandran, 2003).   
 
It is well established now, after the Cancun conference, that the poor countries can not only unite to protest 
their cause with respect to the multilateral trading system but can also withstand the most intense pressures brought 
on by the rich economies to split their unity.  The developing countries refused to discuss the Singapore issues at 
Cancun because they felt that global agreements in these areas would further reduce the space for autonomy in their 
domestic policy.  The Doha round of trade talks are slated to be a “Development Round”, but the proposals at 
Cancun had less to do with furthering development than with furthering the mercantile interests of the advanced 
countries.  The failures at Cancun reflect a loss of confidence in the WTO agenda.  If the WTO is to win the 
confidence of the developing countries, it has to offer an agenda that addresses the concerns and interests of the 
majority of the WTO members.  Mccafferty (2004) has made an interesting observation about Cancun.  According 
to him, a huge disaster has happened at Cancun and most people did not even notice it.  The deal at Cancun is 
supposed to be that the first world would give the third world something on agriculture, and the third world would 
give the first world something in the intellectual property rights.  What the first world lost on the intellectual 
property rights is much bigger than what it gained in their continued ability to subsidize their farmers. 
 
THE RECONCILIATION 
 
Soon after the WTO collapse at Cancun, the developed countries at first wanted to punish the developing 
countries for their upstaging the rich countries.  As Bush (2004) states, the US embarked on a retaliation trail with 
alacrity when the chairman of the senate finance committee warned that the US would take “note” of those countries 
that had “torpedoed” the negotiations at the Cancun conference.  Another method of retaliation used by the US was 
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starting negotiations for bilateral free-trade agreements with individual countries.  For instance, President Bush 
called for a US-Middle Eastern free-trade zone within the next decade.  US had already made deals with Israel and 
Jordan and is in the process of negotiating with Morocco.  As Bhagavati (2004) observes correctly, “what matters 
most is that the negotiators keep talking…Liberalization of agriculture cannot be achieved except through 
multilateral agreements…  Most of the bilateral deals at present exempt agriculture and few exist between countries 
with competing farm sectors.  So, the G-21, US, EU, and Japan have only one real option:  Multilateralism” 
(Bhagavati, 2004).  According to Magnusson (2003) also, the issue of the highly protected US and EU farm 
industries will have to be settled only in the WTO.   
 
 However, as Zedillo (2004) observes, the atmosphere of acrimony and cynicism that prevailed before, 
during, and after Cancun collapse has changed the course of WTO during 2004.  The first sign of the thaw in the 
WTO environment came when the US trade Representative Bob Zoellick indicated a welcome departure from the 
notoriously protectionist US-EU joint proposal made a few weeks before the Cancun meeting which precipitated its 
failure.  In January 2004, Zoellick sent a letter to all the member nations of the WTO in which he called for the 
elimination of export subsidies before a deadline, with the exact date, to be negotiated later.  He also called for cuts 
in domestic farm support and reiterated the US position that developing countries also must open their markets to 
US farm products.  He made it clear that US favors total elimination of tariffs for goods and also suggested that the 
Singapore issues of investment and competition policy be dropped from the agenda.  He called for the frameworks 
for negotiations to be put in place by the middle of 2004 and for the WTO trade ministers to meet in Hong Kong 
before the end of 2004 to resume the Doha round negotiations (Stokes, 2004). 
 
DOHA ROUND, RESUSCITATED AND THE HAVE NOT’S BEGIN TO HAVE IT 
 
After the Cancun collapse, the WTO multilateral system was on the verge of being replaced with bilateral 
and regional trade agreements implying the certain end of the Doha Round.  But, on July 31, 2004, what is termed as 
a “truly historic milestone” has occurred.  On that day, a consensus emerged at the WTO negotiations in Geneva. An   
accord was hammered out by five WTO members – Australia, Brazil, the EU, the US and India - and submitted to 
the WTO’s 147-member plenary session which ratified the agreement.  Under the accord, the US and the EU agreed 
to eliminate agricultural export subsidies and to make substantial reduction, starting with a 20 per cent cut, in 
domestic farm supports.  Developing countries too, led by India and Brazil, agreed to lower barriers to trade in 
manufactured goods and services from the developed countries (Barone, 2004).  Beyond doubt, the WTO Doha 
Round has been resuscitated from the 2003 collapse in Cancun.  It is put back on track, paving the way for 
resumption of negotiations next year in Hong Kong on the more critical issues of liberalization of global trade that 
would be equally fair to both developed and the developing countries.  It is also evident that the close unity among 
the developing countries held on even under extreme pressure and was largely instrumental in forcing the developed 
countries, mainly EU and US, to come down from their inflexible positions and agree to eliminate export subsidies, 
reduce a variety of domestic farm subsidies, and make disproportionate reductions in high import tariffs.  The 2004 
Geneva accord is far more supportive of the interests of developing countries than the proposals suggested at the 
Cancun Round.   Under the Geneva agreement, the developing nations can make less than proportionate reduction in 
import duties on farm products, take emergency measures to control imports, and continue to provide financial 
support to domestic agriculture if they can afford to do so (The Hindu, 2004).  Another positive outcome of the 
Geneva agreement is that the EU has finally agreed to drop three very controversial Singapore issues – foreign 
investment, competition policies, and transparency - from the Doha agenda.   Out of the original four Singapore 
issues that wrought so much havoc at the Cancun Round and threatened to wreck the Doha agenda, only trade 
facilitation – harmonization of customs procedures – remains on the agenda (The Hindu, 2004).    As Deccan 
Chronicle (2004) editorializes, “the new (WTO Geneva) accord helped highlight the point that affluent nations 
cannot forever exploit the weaknesses of the poorer nations to enrich their own economies through discriminatory 
trade practices”.  
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